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Abstract
We devise a ‘nudging’ natural experiment to test the impact of a simple form of adver-
tising on environmentally responsible products with/without the increase of the responsible
product price. We find that the simple use of a small shelf-poster explaining the importance
of buying a green product (with/without a concurring price increase) generates significant
changes in market shares for some of the product classes for both food and non-food prod-
ucts. Part of the effect is generated by the reduced price elasticity of consumers to the
poster-plus-price-increase treatment.
Keywords: nudging, environmental sustainability, randomised field experiment.
JEL Classification: C93 (Field experiments), D12 (Consumer economics: empirical anal-
ysis), M14 (Corporate culture; Social Responsibility), Q56 (Environment and Development;
Sustainability)
1 Introduction
The role of nudging as a new and original policy solution to pursue socially optimal goals has
recently started being investigated by the behavioural economic literature. In this paper we devise
a natural nudging experiment aimed at stimulating environmentally responsible behaviour, and
discuss how our experimental framework provides a novel contribution to the research fields of
nudging and environmental sustainability.
As is well known, Pigou taxes and regulation have been classically considered as two possible
solutions to environmental market failures in the literature but their actual implementation
presents several problems. Beyond the difficulties and costs of measuring properly the distance
between producer private optimum and social optimum, and/or of enforcing proper regulation,
the picture becomes even more complex in globalised economies where a tax which raises the cost
of pollution in one country may produce delocalisation and ‘race to the bottom’ of companies
looking for the cheapest environmental production costs. The recent literature on green nudges
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(Schubert, 2016) suggests that a libertarian paternalistic approach on the demand side which
slightly modifies the frame in which agents’ choices occur may contribute to solve the problem
with very limited costs for policymakers. Our natural experiment proposes a typical green
nudge consisting of a small poster advertising the importance of buying an environmentally
responsible product (see Figure 1). The small poster is strategically placed in a selected group
of supermarkets on the shelves where products can be found replacing the traditional price tag.1
Our experiment falls within the nudging definition since, contrary to incentive based measures,
it keeps intact the choice set and the monetary incentives of players. As well, the strategic
placement of the poster and the emphasis on the importance of buying an environmentally
responsible product are two features that go beyond the neutral information provision (Schubert,
2016).
The experiment also shares with the nudging approach the paternalistic libertarian vision, even
though with some specific qualifications. It is paternalistic since it aims at improving the envi-
ronment and, through it, the wellbeing of players, consistently with the ‘paternalistic’ definition
of Thaler and Sustein (2003).2 As we explain in section 2, if we make reference to the vote with
the wallet literature (Becchetti and Salustri, 2015) the choice of a green responsible product
against the conventional alternative falls into the class of multiplayer prisoner’s dilemmas: a
coordinated vote with the wallet of all players choosing the responsible vis á vis the conventional
(cheaper) product makes all of them better off, even though the dominant strategy for each
individual is to choose the conventional product. In this sense our experiment falls better into
the welfarian paternalistic nudging category than into the strictly paternalistic nudging category.
That is, given the typical coordination failure problem of the above sketched social dilemma, the
suggested choice does not per se improve agent’s wellbeing if the agent’s choice is not followed
also by similar choices by the other agents.
Another interesting element in the definition of our nudging experiment is related to the issue
of agents’ preference assumptions. As is well known there is a strict connection in the literature
between nudging and bounded rationality. In essence, nudging can produce significant changes
in players’ action by only using slight frame changes if agents are ‘humans’ and not ‘Econs’, that
is, if they suffer from some forms of irrationality by which the nudge can modify their utility and
their choices, even in absence of changes of monetary incentives in the choice set.3 Our reference
to the vote with the wallet model suggests a slightly different story here where nudging does not
need to be inevitably related to bounded rationality. The nudge represented by the label may in
fact have two effects that modify choices of fully rational agents even without changing monetary
incentives of the choice set. First, the nudge can reinforce their beliefs on the environmentally
sustainable features of the product, thereby reducing informational asymmetries in this specific
domain (see the model in the Appendix). Players therefore choose the environmental product
because they are more convinced than before about its characteristics that in turn satisfy the
other-regarding component (if any) of their preferences. Second, the nudge can change players’
expectation on the choice of the other players (see Appendix). This aspect is crucial in the vote
with the wallet multiplayer prisoner’s dilemma structure. Players may have in fact reciprocity
arguments (Rabin, 1993) that typically explain conditional cooperation in aggregate and make
1In this sense our experiment belongs to the same class of ‘green nudging experiments’ where, for instance, the
‘no’ button answer to the question about printing the ATM receipt is moved strategically to the right (the side
of the screen where attention is more easily focused and the previous bottom had been pushed) and a message
in green appears on the screen during cashing operations saying that not printing cash receipts is the ‘advised
choice’.
2“[The intervention] is selected with the goal of influencing the choices of affected parties in a way that will
make those parties better off” (Thaler and Sunstein, 2003, p. 175).
3‘A nudge is any factor that significantly alters the behavior of Humans, even though it would be ignored by
Econs” (emphasis added), where ‘Econs’ refers, basically, to homo economicus.
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it rational for them to cooperate (buy the responsible product) if all other players (or a number
of players consistent with their expectations) cooperate, while making it rational to suspend
cooperation if the share of cooperators falls. In this perspective the nudge (the label) may
change players’ expectation on the number of cooperators inducing them rationally to buy the
responsible product.
In the literature we find few examples of experiments similar to ours showing that, while con-
sumers attach value to ethical sourcing, there is significant heterogeneity in the willingness to
pay for it. Hudson, Gallardo and Hanson (2012) analyse the capacity of a choice experiment to
predict grocery store market shares, finding that the level of control in the grocery store exper-
iment and the choice of econometric model influence results. Hainmueller, Hiscox and Sequeira
(2014) find that sales of the two most popular coffees rose by almost 10% when they carried a
Fair Trade label as compared to a generic placebo label. Demand for the higher priced coffee
remained steady when its price was raised by 8%, but demand for the lower priced coffee was
elastic since a 9% price increase led to a 30% decline in sales. Hiscox, Broukhim and Litwin
(2011) measure consumers’ willingness to pay with an experiment conducted on eBay and doc-
ument that shoppers paid a 23% premium for coffee labeled Fair Trade. More in general, and
similarly to what is done in our experiment, other contributions have shown that reference to
social norms has strong effects on pro-social behaviour (Griskevicius, Cialdini and Goldstein,
2006; Goldstein et al., 2008; Goldstein and Cialdini, 2009).
As we will remark below, under the assumption that consumption of some of the products on
which our experiment is run does not significantly contribute to consumers’ health, a significant
effect of our treatment may be interpreted as contributing to the more general literature testing
for the existence of other-regarding preferences. As is well known the quite ample literature
in this field theoretically developed and empirically tested several concepts such as reciprocity
(Rabin, 1993), inequity aversion (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999 and Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000),
pure and impure altruism (Andreoni, 1989 and 1990) and social welfare preferences (Charness
and Rabin, 2002). Most of the empirical evidence documented in this literature hinges on lab
experiments and therefore the use of field experiments to test for the existence of other-regarding
preferences is a clear added value, especially in terms of the external validity of the empirical
findings.
Our experiment relates to the different strands of the literature mentioned in the introduction
(nudging, other-regarding preferences, willingness to pay experiments) since we test for the first
time the effect of a shelf poster treatment simultaneously applied to a wide range of green
products. The empirical results of the paper show that the treatment has positive and significant
effects on the market shares of a relevant part of the treated products. Part of the effects is related
to the poster treatment per se, while part of them to consumers’s price inelasticity in the poster
plus price change treatments.
Our findings have straightforward policy implications. If public information on corporate envi-
ronmental responsibility available at shopping places has a significant effect on customers, the
provision of proper information and elicitation of consumers’ environmental preferences may sig-
nificantly help policymakers to achieve social and environmental goals at lower costs than what
is the case with taxes or regulation.
The paper is divided into six sections. In the second section we present the experiment design.
In the third section we outline our theoretical framework. In the fourth section we define our
testable hypotheses, while in the fifth section we present and comment our empirical findings.
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2 The experiment design
In order to investigate the consumer demand for socially and environmentally responsible con-
sumption, we conduct our field experiment in 12 Coop Italia (Coop) grocery stores. Coop is a
system of Italian consumers’ cooperatives operating the biggest Italian grocery store chain.4 Our
analysis focuses on the Vivi Verde (VV) brand, a line of Coop products with a high ecological
footprint. VV food products are organic products, and VV non-food products are ‘EU Ecolabel’5
certified products or, more generally, environmentally sustainable labeled products.
During the treatment phases, we place a label on the shelves where VV products are located. The
label is titled “Why buying Vivi Verde” and says: “This product comes from organic farming and
has been projected and realised keeping into account its environmental impact. By purchasing
this product at a fair price you are supporting environmentally responsible producer policies.
A cleaner world is better also for you” (Figure 1). The first part of the message is the official
product information also displayed on the Coop website. The second part highlights the positive
externality of the purchase. The label is designed by the Coop marketing staff and is written in
Italian. The title and the message display the same font size as the price and the product name
respectively.
We create three types of treatments: the ‘label’ (Label), the ‘label plus 5 percent price increase’
(Label5), and the ‘label plus 10 percent price increase’ (Label10). In the Lab treatment, we
introduce the shelf poster without changing product prices. In the Label5 treatment, we introduce
the shelf poster and raise prices of the VV products by 5 percent. In the Label10 treatment, we
introduce the shelf poster and raise prices of the VV products by 10 percent. For each treatment,
we select 4 retail stores among those with the highest sales in the region of Tuscany where Coop
mainly operates. We adopt a two-phase, two-group crossover design (Jones and Kenward 2003).
We randomly pair the stores in 2 groups and randomly assign each group to a treatment-control
sequence or viceversa, as shown in Table 2. Table 1 shows the randomisation checks for each
type of treatment.6 Phase 1 takes place from 30 May to 26 June 2016, while phase 2 takes
place from 27 June to 24 July 2016.7 In addition, we monitor one treatment-free store that we
consider as a parallel control store. The crossover design is more efficient than a simple parallel
group design, because, if we assume no carry-over, it allows to exploit within-store variation for
each store. The no carry-over assumption may be violated if consumers in the treatment-control
sequence continue to choose products in phase 2 (control) because of information learned during
phase 1. We rely on the fact that the violation of the no carry assumption provides a downward
bias for the poster effect, since consumers who already know the information simply continue
to be sensitive to the treatment even under the control condition. To check the no carry-over
assumption, we perform two robustness checks that look at the last two weeks for each phase
and that look at the stores belonging to group 2 (treatment-control sequence) only.
Table 1: Randomisation checks.
Treatment Group Control Group
Label Experiment
Total Store Sales 2015 AC57,082,727.11 AC55,642,814.83
4In 2016, Coop has the leadership among grocery retailers in Italy with a 10 percent share of sales value
(Euromonitor International, 2016).
5EU Ecolabel is a EU-recognised label that identifies products and services with a reduced environmental
impact. For more information see http://ec.europa.eu/environment/ecolabel/.
6Given the limited number of stores used in the experiment it is not possible to have a statistical test of the
balancing properties between the treatment and control group.
7One store in group 2 started the treatment phase 3 days later, and it ended 3 days later as well.
4
Secondary Education (% within the neighbourhood) 60.42 59.90
Foreign people (% within the neighbourhood) 9.90 10.75
Relative Income (100 = household average) 96.02 93.20
Label5 Experiment
Total Store Sales 2015 AC88,618,570.12 AC81,168,581.82
Secondary Education (% within the neighbourhood) 64.53 65.17
Foreign people (% within the neighbourhood) 16.55 15.45
Relative Income (100 = household average) 99.20 99.12
Label10 Experiment
Total Store Sales 2015 AC70,204,034.89 AC68,389,908.89
Secondary Education (% within the neighbourhood) 63.43 66.77
Foreign people (% within the neighbourhood) 11.30 12.30
Relative Income (100 = household average) 96.09 101.78
For our experiment, we select 22 out of 270 VV products (Table 3). The logic of our selection is
that of including products from a variety of classes, combining food and non-food products. Since
consumers may want to buy a green product for environmental and/or health reasons we take
care of having in our sample products that have different impact on consumers’ health. More
specifically, we include i) food products; ii) non-food products that may enter into contact with
the human body (i.e., dish detergents and lip protectors); iii) non-food products that produce
emissions that can be inhaled (such as surface cleaners) and iv) non-food products that do not
enter in any of these ways into contact with the human body (such as bin liners).
We checked periodically that the experiments were performed correctly during treatment and
control periods and took photographs to confirm that the treatment was properly implemented.
Table 2: Treatment and control phases.
Phase 1 Phase 2
30 May – 26 June 27 June – 24 July
Group 1 (2 stores) Treatment Control
Group 2 (2 stores) Control Treatment
3 Research design and Methodology
3.1 Discrete-choice model
The econometric specification that we will present in section 5 hinges on the Nevo (2010) theo-
retical benchmark. According to Nevo (2010) the indirect utility of consumer i from consuming
good j in market k is
Uijt = U(xjt, ξjt, Ii − pjt, τi; θ)
where xjt is a vector of observed good characteristics, ξjt is a vector of unobserved (by the
researchers) good characteristics (i.e., the positive value perception of the treated products for
consumers with other-regarding preferences), Ii − pjt represents the income-price difference, τi
are individual characteristics, and θ is a vector of parameters to be estimated.
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A simplified version of indirect utility writes
uijt = αi(Ii − pjt) + βixjt + ξjt + εijt (1)
where εijt is a stochastic term. The parameter αi is the individual marginal utility from income
and βi is a K×1 vector of individual specific taste coefficient. The vector ξjt captures unobserved
good characteristics, unquantifiable factors (including the focus of our experiment, that is, the
environmental responsibility of the brand), systematic demand shocks, or unobserved promo-
tional activity. The introduction of ξjt not only helps in explaining the data, but also implies
that, if firms observe ξjt before making production plans, prices and other choice variables could
be endogenous.
The individual taste parameters are modelled as
αi = α+
d∑
r=1
pi1rDir + σ1vi1
βik = βk +
d∑
r=1
pi(k+1)rDir + σk+1vi(k+1) for k = 1, . . . ,K
(2)
where Di is a d × 1 vector of observed socio-demographic variables, vi is a vector of K + 1
unobserved individual characteristics, assumed to have a standard normal distribution Fv, Π =
(pimn)m=1,...,K+1,n=1,...,d is a (K + 1) × d matrix of parameters, and σ = (σ1, . . . , σK+1) is a
vector of parameters. The individual indirect utility from the outside option – that is from not
purchasing any of the goods – is given by
ui0t = αiIi + εi0t
Since we are interested in the relative utilities, we remove the individual income term Ii. Then,
by combining equations (1) and (2) we obtain
uijt = δjt + µijt + εijt
where δjt = xjtβ − αpjt + ξjt is the mean utility across consumers and µijt = −(
∑d
r=1 pi1rDir +
σ1vi1)pjt+
∑K
k=1(
∑d
r=1 pi(k+1)rDir+σk+1vi(k+1))x
k
jt is the interaction of consumer socio-demographics
and good characteristics, which together with the random term εijt captures the variation around
the mean utility δjt.
The probability that a consumer of type (Di, vi) chooses good j is
sijt =
∫
1[uijt ≥ uikt∀l | xt, δt, pt, Di, vi; θ] dFε(ε)
where 1[·] is the indicator function.
Thus, market shares are given by
sjt = sjt(xt, δt, pt; θ) =
∫
sijt dFD(D)Fv(v)
If we assume Π = 0, σ = 0 (which imply βi = β and αi = α for all i), εijt are iid and follows a
Gumbel distribution, then we can apply the multinomial logit model and the market shares are
given by
sjt =
exp{xjtβ − αpjt + ξjt}
1 +
∑J
k=1 exp{xjtβ − αpjt + ξjt}
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3.2 Hypothesis testing
Our field experiment consists in testing the following four hypotheses separately for each of the
three (Label, Label5, and Label10) treatments.
The first hypothesis is
HTi01 = (insignificance of the i-th treatment for any of the VV products in the treated product
class).
The null of HT i01 states that the i-th treatment has no effect on consumers’ choices, that is,
the treatment does not change any of the market shares of the 18 VV products considered
in the experiment. This should be the case in the presence of the following two conditions:
i) purely self-regarding consumer preferences and ii) no concern for health related problems
arising from the purchase of less environmentally sustainable products. Rejection of the null
for some of the VV products once consumers’ imperfect information on their environmentally
sustainable characteristics is reduced by the shelf poster treatment would imply that provision
of information on corporate environmental responsibility is a strategy that marketing experts
and/or policymakers may successfully choose in order to affect product sales. Such rejection in
turn implies that consumers perceive a nexus between environmental sustainability and their
health or, if this is not the case, have other-regarding preferences (see the theoretical framework
in the Appendix).
HTi02 = (insignificance of the i-th treatment for the food VV products)
The null of HTi02 states that the treatment does not affect in aggregate sales of VV food products,
that is, the aggregate market share of the specific food VV products within their specific product
classes becomes not significantly different when the treatment is introduced. The rejection of the
null in direction of higher market shares with the treatment again implies that the information
strategy works and can be successfully implemented for marketing or welfare purpose. Even in
this case, rejection of the null may be further interpreted in two directions: i) consumers care
about their health and believe that, by buying an environmentally sustainable food product,
they may positively contribute to it; ii) consumers have in their utility function an argument
that gives positive value to environmental sustainability per se. Under ii) we have a case for
other-regarding preferences under the reasonable assumption that a single consumer choice of
the green product does not produce per se a positive environmental externality on the same
consumer large enough to compensate the loss of utility arising for the deviation from her/his
optimal pre-treatment choice (see the theoretical framework in the Appendix). Under case i)
self-regarding preferences and, more specifically, care for one’s own health are sufficient to explain
what we observe.
HT i03 =(insignificance of the i-th treatment for the non-food VV products)
The third null hypothesis states that the treatment does not affect in aggregate sales of VV
non-food products. Note here that rejection of the null in the direction of higher market shares
of VV non-food products under the treatment (the shelf poster on environmental sustainability)
is less likely to be be interpreted as arising from health concerns since non-food products are
less likely to affect health. We remark however that not all non-food products may strictly be
considered as not affecting personal health. With reference to our products, consumers may
believe that non ecological dish detergents, lip protectors and surface cleaners may in some sense
be related to products or chemical substances that are detrimental to health. We therefore
identify a subset of VV non-food products that may be considered as more distant from personal
health considerations (or for which the green characteristics are expected to be less likely to affect
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personal health). We think that bin liners are the product that is more distant from affecting
personal health.
In order to disentangle the two interpretations for the rejection of the null under hypotheses one,
two and three we therefore formulate hypothesis four as follows
HT i04 = (insignificance of the shelf poster treatment for the bin liner VV product)
the fourth null is a sharper test on the existence of other-regarding preferences since the product
object of our test is the most distant from having consequences on consumers’ health. More
specifically in this respect, we consider a taxonomy of four types of products according to con-
sumers’ perception of their potential impact on health: i) food products; ii) non-food products
that enter directly or indirectly into contact with the human body (i.e., lip protectors, dish de-
tergents, shower products, napkins); iii) non-food products that produce emissions that can be
inhaled (i.e., surface cleaners); iv) non-food products that do not have characteristics of products
in ii) and iii) (i.e., bin liners). The null of HT i04 relates to the insignificant effect of the treatment
on products in category iv).
4 Descriptive and econometric analysis
Table 3 shows the list of products that are labeled, divided by market class with their relative
prices. Market classes are defined by Coop and they reflect the arrangement of the products in
the shelves. This allows us to consider all the products within a selected market as substitutes.
Table 4 shows descriptive statistics for the prices in each market. It also contains statistics
regarding the difference between the price and the average market price. We notice that, on
average, the price of VV products is lower than the average market price. This contradicts the
common opinion that environmentally sustainable products cost more than their substitutes.
Table 3: List of VV products selected for the treatment.
Product class Product Price (24-Mar-2016)
Teas Fruits Tea, 20p 1.57
Pasta Spaghetti, 500g 0.75
Pasta Fusilli, 500g 0.75
Pasta Penne, 500g 0.75
Pasta Whole Wheat Spaghetti, 500g 0.75
Pasta Whole Wheat Fusilli, 500g 0.75
Pasta Whole Wheat Penne, 500g 0.75
Pasta Whole Wheat Ditali, 500g 0.75
Bread and substitutes Whole Wheat Crackers, 150g 0.66
Tomato preserves Tomato Pulp, 690g 0.89
Dish detergents Washing-up Liquid, 1l 1.05
Big surface cleaners Floor Cleaner ‘Camellia’, 1l 1.35
Small surface cleaners Glass Cleaner, 750ml 1.67
Bin Liner Bin Liner, 15l 15p 1.95
Tablecloths and napkins 2-ply Napkins, 33×33×50 0.63
Disposable table covers Plastic Cups 200cc no. 25 1.01
Bathroom products Shower Gel, 250ml 2.10
Toilet paper Toilet Paper, 4 Rolls 1.90
Lip protectors Lip Balm 1.86
Handkerchief 4-Ply Paper Handkerchief, 10×9 0.77
Fruit Juices Blood Orange Juice, 750ml 1.70
White kidney beans White kidney beans, 500g 1.98
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Table 4: Descriptive statistics of the products in the selected product classes.
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Average prices
Pasta 10,228 1.20 0.755 0.38 5.90
Bread and substitutes 2,200 1.77 0.790 0.55 4.99
Tomato preserves 3,682 1.43 0.703 0.35 9.84
Dish detergents 3,237 3.20 2.258 0.47 17.80
Big surface cleaners 3,012 2.23 1.323 0.29 6.99
Small surface cleaners 4,857 2.39 1.143 0.59 9.8
Bin liners 923 1.67 1.166 0.65 7.80
Tablecloths and napkins 938 1.76 1.280 0.39 6.99
Disposable table covers 1,504 1.93 1.235 0.49 5.09
Bathroom products 10,641 2.32 1.218 0.48 11.9
Toilet paper 865 2.95 1.699 0.99 9.90
Lip protectors 675 2.23 1.195 0.74 4.73
Handkerchief 856 1.75 1.257 0.47 7.98
Fruit juices 457 2.27 0.804 1.59 3.69
White kidney beans 5,021 2.25 1.016 0.90 8.40
Average VV prices
Pasta 523 1.27 0.683 0.75 2.18
Bread and substitutes 144 1.30 0.649 0.66 2.19
Tomato preserves 192 0.79 0.081 0.69 0.89
Dish detergents 185 1.26 0.809 0.52 2.59
Big surface cleaners 55 1.26 0.243 0.55 1.35
Small surface cleaners 95 1.49 0.176 1.32 1.67
Bin liners 132 1.30 0.430 0.99 1.95
Tablecloths and napkins 48 0.63 0 0.63 0.63
Disposable table covers 130 2.18 0.820 1.09 2.79
Bathroom products 96 1.98 0.126 1.85 2.10
Toilet paper 48 1.90 0 1.90 1.90
Lip protectors 47 1.86 0 1.86 1.86
Handkerchief 48 0.79 0 0.79 0.79
Fruit juices 48 1.70 0 1.70 1.70
White kidney beans 523 1.90 0.225 1.35 2.40
Price is the average regular retail price per unit of product for the given (All,
VV) category. Units of product are standardised by market. Observations
are taken from the control phase of the experiment.
Table 5 presents total treatment and control sales in each of the selected supermarkets, while
Table 6 does it for each of the treated product class. Under all of the three treatment conditions
jointly considered overall sales for our selected markets increase by 1.7 percent, even if this
increase is not homogeneous across the different markets. Total sales of VV products also grow
by 0.9 percent, and by 6 percent under the label plus 5 percent price increase treatment. However,
under the label plus 10 percent price increase treatment, sales decrease by 2.3 percent. These
weak aggregate findings conceal strong heterogeneity in treatment effects across the different
VV products. The econometric analysis that follows will help to shed light on this seemingly
insignificant effect of the treatment when viewed at aggregate level with descriptive findings.
Table 5: Total store sales, by treatment.
Total Sales (AC) Sales of selected markets (AC)
Store Control Treatment Control Treatment
Gavinana 6,243,215 5,938,517 76,184 70,702
Empoli 6,274,692 6,213,352 74,480 73,491
Pontedera 4,152,686 4,116,991 55,595 57,346
Prato 7,123,529 7,184,454 87,479 88,072
Figline 4,953,176 5,379,769 65,559 67,201
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Ponte a Greve 6,136,128 6,768,738 73,079 79,104
Pontassieve 3,779,418 3,754,279 54,029 52,048
Poggibonsi 4,929,677 4,839,383 59,828 60,831
Borgo San Lorenzo 3,646,086 3,570,964 52,713 56,234
Pistoia 4,261,048 4,144,520 53,502 51,369
Montevarchi 5,766,883 5,636,025 72,628 72,352
Sesto Fiorentino 5,724,176 6,007,893 68,378 70,850
Total 6.30e+07 6.36e+07 793,454 799,599
Table 6: Market sales, by market–treatment.
Total Sales (by market, AC)
Store Control Treatment
Pasta 79,627.43 81,333.13
Bread and substitutes 65,132.94 62,862.79
Tomato preserves 41,635.62 41,393.00
Dish detergents 51,315.75 49,950.20
Surface cleaners 69,143.00 66,370.17
House cleaning optional 66,262.56 66,827.76
Bin liners 15,866.63 15,690.69
Tablecloths and napkins 15,645.79 15,882.90
Disposable table covers 34,098.63 34,850.14
Bathroom products 63,130.71 68,577.24
Toilet paper 56,161.28 57,496.33
Lip protectors 2,232.98 2,359.42
Tissues 8,720.25 9,006.13
Fruit juices 4,313.36 4,142.09
White kidney beans 1,919.73 2,166.96
5 Econometric analysis
In order to measure the impact of the treatment gross effect, we perform a reduced-form econo-
metric analysis. Using a simple specification that follows in part Hainmueller et al. (2014) we
regress the log of the weekly VV sales on the treatment indicators controlling for week/store
fixed effects and prices. We split the 18 selected product classes into two groups: food products
and non-food products. In particular, we regress the following specification
log(si,w) = α+ β0Treatmentw +
∑
h
α1,hWeekh +
∑
k
α2,kStoreh + α3Pricei,w + i,w
where log(si,w) is the log of the sales of the VV product i in week w; Treatmentw is a (0/1)
dummy during the treatment phase (total and separated for each treatment); Weekh and Storek
capture the week and store fixed effects. We also control for the price of product i in week w,
Pricei,w. All the standard errors are clustered at the store level to take into account potential
within-store correlation over time.
Table 7 shows that the overall effect of the treatment is positive and statistically significant
for the food products. In terms of economic significance the treatment generates a two percent
growth in sales. When we decompose the effect into the three different (Label, Label5, and
Label10) treatments we find an aggregate food effect concentrated on the 10 percent price increase
treatment with a 4.3 percent growth in log sales.
Table 7: Reduced-form analysis.
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Food Food NonFood1 NonFood2
Variables Log(sales) Log(sales) Log(sales) Log(sales)
VV (total) 0.0244*** -0.0229*
(0.00654) (0.0124)
VV Label 0.0197 -0.0610**
(0.0116) (0.0222)
VV Label 5 0.0103 -0.00712
(0.00585) (0.0133)
VV Label10 0.0433*** -0.00138
(0.00759) (0.0114)
Price -0.283*** -0.283*** -0.048*** -0.048***
(0.00558) (0..00557) (0.00738) (0.00736)
Store FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Week FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3,212 3,212 3,497 3,497
R-squared 0.047 0.047 0.011 0.012
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
These summary aggregate econometric findings need to be decomposed in order to understand
which product classes drive them. In order to test whether our treatments are significant net of
the impact of confounding factors, we estimate the following specification
δijt = β0TreatVV +
∑
b
β1,bTreatBrandb
+
∑
h
α1,hWeekh +
∑
k
α2,kBrandStorek + α3Priceijt + ijt
where δijt := log(sijt)− log(s00t) are the mean utility levels as a function of the observed market
shares for good i belonging to brand j at week t; TreatVVb is a (0/1) dummy for the VV brand
during the treatment phase; TreatBrandb is a (0/1) dummy for the brands within the same
product class of the VV treated products during the treatment phase; Weekh and BrandStorek
are (0/1) dummy variables capturing the week and the brand/store fixed effects respectively;
Priceijt represents the unit price level of good i belonging to brand j at week t. We cluster
standard errors at the store level.
We differ from the standard discrete choice model (Nevo, 2010) by using the market share of the
brands rather than the products, as we are interested in investigating the effect of the treatment
on the VV brand. We also control for the price level that should matter especially under the
(label plus) 5 and 10 percent increase experiment where the initial price level may be important
while the same should not matter in label experiments.
Table 8: Label and Price Experiment effect on VV goods, by market.
VV VV Elasticity
Market Total Label Price 5% Price 10%
Teas 0.0620 -0.0489 -0.00992 0.249** 0.017
(0.0741) (0.150) (0.0721) (0.0843) (0.0102)
Obs. 9,953 9,953
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R2 0.288 0.290
Long-cut wheat pasta -0.00510 -0.0796 0.0546 0.00970 0.076***
(0.0585) (0.0998) (0.128) (0.0441) (0.006)
Obs. 5,066 5,066
R2 0.600 0.602
Short-cut wheat pasta -0.0627 -0.176 0.0667 -0.0792 0.059***
(0.0625) (0.112) (0.0993) (0.0678) (0.0072)
Obs. 10,468 10,468
R2 0.523 0.524
Whole-wheat pasta -0.00300 0.105*** -0.0808 -0.0374 -0.988**
(0.0335) (0.0332) (0.0579) (0.0545) (0.4291)
Obs. 1,439 1,439
R2 0.743 0.746
Bread and substitutes 0.0443* 0.00282 0.0844** 0.0457 0.053*
(0.0206) (0.0311) (0.0358) (0.0255) (0.0283)
Obs. 4,405 4,405
R2 0.673 0.674
Tomato preserves 0.0319 0.0764*** -0.0130 0.0322 -0.055***
(0.0306) (0.0209) (0.0766) (0.0328) (0.0156)
Obs. 7,332 7,332
R2 0.482 0.483
Dish detergents -0.0955 -0.291 -0.0328 0.0325 0.018*
(0.111) (0.303) (0.0555) (0.0707) (0.0096)
Obs. 6,401 6,401
R2 0.372 0.376
Big surface cleaners 0.265* 0.331 0.419*** 0.0365 0.006
(0.122) (0.268) (0.0406) (0.108) (0.0124)
Obs. 5,941 5,941
R2 0.493 0.495
Small surface cleaners 0.0472 0.106 0.0612 -0.0203 0.047***
(0.0659) (0.125) (0.0957) (0.116) (0.0076)
Obs. 9,624 9,624
R2 0.506 0.508
Bin liner -0.0154 0.0640** -0.105 -0.0118 0.0004
(0.0374) (0.0224) (0.100) (0.0159) (0.0004)
Obs. 1,837 1,837
R2 0.434 0.434
Tablecloths and napkins 0.0831** 0.0561 0.119* 0.0742** 0.327***
(0.0284) (0.0592) (0.0551) (0.0259) (0.0587)
Obs. 1,859 1,859
R2 0.699 0.700
Disposable table covers 0.0336 0.0325 -0.0212 0.0921 -0.171***
(0.0980) (0.175) (0.198) (0.129) (0.0081)
Obs. 2,993 2,993
R2 0.420 0.420
Bathroom products 0.134* 0.111 0.0198 0.270 -0.012*
(0.0678) (0.0822) (0.0547) (0.151) (0.0055)
Obs. 21,077 21,077
R2 0.243 0.244
Toilet paper -0.00453 0.0481 -0.0483 -0.0123 0.216***
(0.0700) (0.0782) (0.0877) (0.174) (0.0329)
Obs. 1,729 1,729
R2 0.632 0.635
Lip protectors 0.0911 -0.0545 0.195 0.137*** 0.239***
(0.119) (0.310) (0.143) (0.0330) (0.0264)
Obs. 1,349 1,349
R2 0.354 0.358
Tissues 0.0112 0.0472 -0.0302 0.0165 -0.372*
(0.0313) (0.0604) (0.0522) (0.0437) (0.0171)
Obs. 1,723 1,723
R2 0.740 0.739
Fruit juices 0.182** 0.138 0.143 0.298** 0.594
(0.0808) (0.113) (0.103) (0.119) (0.4390)
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Obs. 896 896
R2 0.541 0.549
White kidney beans 0.128* 0.0560 0.255* 0.0703 0.100***
(0.0627) (0.0992) (0.116) (0.0717) (0.0069)
Obs. 9,967 9,967
R2 0.123 0.125
All estimates include week and brand/store fixed effects as well as price control.
Robust standard errors in parentheses and clustered at store level.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
As explained in the introduction, the original characteristic of our field experiment consists of
the simultaneous application of the treatment on a large set of products and not on one product
only as in Hainmueller, Hiscox and Sequeira (2014). This novel feature allows us to formulate
new research questions such as on which of the treated products the treatment has significant
effects.
The issue at stake in this research question is that it is unrealistic to expect that the treatment
raises expenditure on all the treated products given that this could produce a too strong impact on
the aggregate increase in expenditure. The expected selection of effects on the treated products
should produce redistributive effects implying a hierarchy of preferences among them. Hence
the experiment allows us to understand what are the products on which there is more range for
improvement with green nudging and which of their characteristics are more likely to determine
such improvement (our null hypotheses 2-4 relate to this last point).
Econometric findings presented in Table 8 show that the treatment is significant for 11 out of
18 products (even though weakly so in two cases), thereby rejecting the null (H01) described in
section 3.2. The effect is unevenly distributed among the three (Label, Label5, and Label10)
treatments. In terms of economic significance, the strongest effect is the 47 percent increase on
small surface cleaners, with many other significant effects being above the 10 percent increase in
magnitude. Another characteristic of our findings is that the significance of the treatment seems
to be stronger on food than on non-food products. More specifically, the treatment is significant
on six out of eight food products. The two cases of non significance concern two pasta subclasses,
while the third pasta subclass with product characteristics that are closer to the environmental
sustainability perception (i.e., whole wheat pasta) registers a significant effect.
The pattern of economic significance of the treatment effects is not negligible, especially if we
consider that at least three factors may contribute to reduce the impact of our treatment. First,
our experiment occurs at the end of a long recession period in Italy (OECD, 2015) originated
by the global financial crisis that led to a reduction of 12 percent of Italian household income.
It is therefore reasonable to assume that the willingness to pay for environmental sustainability
may have been weakened by the prolonged crisis spell in this historical period. Second, coop
supermarkets are attended by consumers who are more sensitive to sustainability than average,
since most of them are also shareholders of the Coop chain and the Coop movement has a long
tradition of sensitivity to social and environmental problems. We therefore expect the shares of
the VV products to be already at high levels, and room for further improvement is thus limited.
Third, the photo of our experiment setting (see Figures 2) shows that the shelf poster has a
message printed in a standard low size font that may not be easily read by consumers with poor
eyesight. In this sense our goal was to test whether even a weak green nudging signal could
produce significant effects on consumption shares of the treated products.
A final important finding of our experiment is related to the hypothesis of the existence of other-
regarding preferences. As explained above we need to disentangle to this purpose the environment
effect from the health effect. The self-regarding health effect is presumed to be stronger on food
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products that enter consumers’ body, weaker but still present on products that come into contact
with consumers’ body (i.e., lip protectors) and even weaker on products that do not enter into
contact with consumers’ body but that emit substances that can be inhaled (i.e., surface cleaners
and detergents). The only product that has none of these three characteristics is bin liners. Our
findings show that our treatment is significant on that product and therefore provide evidence
in favour of rejection of (H04), that is, the null of absence of other-regarding preferences.
6 Conclusions
We perform a green nudging natural experiment with crossover design by using as a treatment
a poster on supermarket shelves explaining the importance of environmental responsibility in
proximity of 18 green (VV) products. Our findings document a significant and economically
remarkable effect on treated products’ market shares in many of the relevant product market
subclasses. Part of the effect is determined by the price inelasticity of consumers in the poster
plus price increase (Label5, Label10) treatments as shown by our estimated elasticities. Evidence
of the significance of the treatment effect also on non-food products that presumably have limited
effects on personal health, and, more so, evidence of significance on bin liners where health effects
are irrelevant, suggests that the significant reaction to the treatment effect is partially due to
the presence of non-purely self-regarding preferences.
Our experiment shows that emphasis on the environmentally responsible features of products
placed in strategic places is a low cost, high impact policy that may significantly shift con-
sumers toward green purchases. The cost-effectiveness of such policies should be compared with
those based on more traditional incentive schemes. In a sense, the problem with environmental
sustainability is that corporate profit functions do not internalise the negative environmental
externalities of firm choices along the supply chain (notably in terms of emissions and waste
management). The provision of information to final consumers on their level of environmental
responsibility at selling places may be in this respect crucial to internalise the negative social
costs of such externalities helping to bridge the gap between private and social optimum.
Our findings have several implications in terms of policy and further research in the field. Our
experiment documents significant effects on product sales of a small shelf poster experiment. One
should ask what the aggregate effects could be of the provision of such information on large scale,
and whether this could contribute to modify costs and rewards of environmentally sustainable
choices at corporate level. Future research could also seek to estimate the effect of information
providers such as TripAdvisor in the specific field of social and environmental responsibility as
a stimulus for the production and the diffusion of information in this specific domain for the
general public.
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Figure 1: The labels during the treatment conditions in the Label (a) and the Label5 and Label10 (b)
experiment.
(a) (b)
Figure 2: The labels on the shelves during the treatment phase.
(a) (b)
The base model and the imperfect information versions
In presence of a perception that an environmental friendly product has positive effect on one’s
own health, the positive impact of the shelf-treatment is trivially explained by self-regarding
preferences. However, consider the case of products where consumer’s perception of the link
with health is absent.
Following Becchetti and Salustri (2015)’s vote with the wallet model, the utility function for each
j-th consumer choosing the strategy Sj may be written as
Uj(S
j , k) =
{
k+1
n b+ a− c if Sj = R
k
nb if S
j = C
(3)
where R indicates the strategy of buying responsibly (i.e., changing choices after having infor-
mation from the campaign poster), C the strategy of buying conventionally (i.e., not changing
choices after having information from the campaign poster), and k represents the number of
responsible co-buyers. The model, conveniently and without lack of generality, assumes that the
global common good effect is multiplicative on the share of consumers making the responsible
choice.
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Since we are in large consumer markets, we conveniently assume that n players are playing this
game, with n being very large and only a small subset of n being represented by consumers
buying in the supermarket where the poster is exposed. The area of the prisoner’s dilemma for
the individual consumer is defined by the following inequality
1
n
b+ a < c < a+ b (4)
and it is optimal to choose the responsible product only if
c <
1
n
b+ a (5)
The framework of our experiment is that of mass consumer markets where n is very large. This
implies that the first part of the LHS of the inequality gets close to zero. As a consequence, the
consumer chooses the responsible product only if she has nonzero other-regarding preferences,
even when the cost differential between the responsible and the conventional product (i.e., c)
is small or, in formal terms, with c > 0 and limb→∞ 1nb = 0 inequality (5) holds if and only
if a > 0. It is trivial to check that, with perfect information on product characteristics, the
area of the Prisoner’s dilemma and the cooperation condition do not change with our base label
(with no price increase) experiment. Hence the treatment should not produce any significant
effect. Consider however now the following modified version of the model where consumers
are imperfectly informed about corporate environmental responsibility and therefore the other-
regarding argument entering the value of the cooperating choice is made by a+ e, where a is the
deterministic component of the base model and e is a normally distributed random variable with
zero mean and variance σ2 capturing uncertainty on the responsible characteristics of the product.
Assume as well that risk averse consumers have a standard utility function with coefficient of
risk aversion γ.
The Prisoner’s dilemma condition therefore becomes
1
n
b+ a(1− γσ2) < c < a(1− γσ2) + b (A1)
The new pre-treatment condition for a cooperative choice is
c <
1
n
b+ a(1− γσ2) (A2)
We now consider our Label treatment and assume that it eliminates consumers’ perception of
informational asymmetry about the responsible characteristics of the chosen products. Consider
as well that, since our base label treatment does not provide specific information but works on
persuasion and perceptions, we remain within the green nudging case. As a consequence, the
post-treatment condition for a cooperative choice becomes
c <
1
n
b+ a (A2’)
(A2’) is slightly easier to achieve than (A2)so that, after the treatment is introduced, some
consumers may find it optimal to switch to the purchase of the green product. Note as well that,
according to this modified version of the base model, a significant change in the cooperative
choice induced by the treatment not only implies that the treatment eliminates (or significantly
reduces) the informational asymmetry, but also that a > 0 or that consumers have nonzero
other-regarding preferences. Hence, the presence of other-regarding preferences is a necessary
condition for the significance of the treatment under this specific version of the model.
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A second modified version of the model can be considered by including the presence of a reci-
procity argument where the value of the cooperative choice is function of the number of co-
operators. As is well known (Rabin, 1987), reciprocity implies that players have a disutility
in cooperating the larger the number of people who cooperate and viceversa. In this second
modified version pre-treatment payoffs of the different strategies are as follows Cooperation:
(E(j)+1n )b+a(1−γσ2)−c+rE(j) Non cooperation E(j)n b+a(1−γσ2) where rE(j) is the positive
reciprocity effect that is function of the number of cooperators. As a result the pre-treatment
cooperation condition becomes
c <
1
n
b+ a(1− γσ2) + rE(j) (A2”)
Under this version of the model augmented with reciprocity arguments post treatment payoffs
become Cooperation: E(j+dj(T ))+1n b+a−c+rE(j+dj(T )) Non cooperation
E(j+dj(T ))
n b+a where
dj(T ) is the player j’s expected change in the number of cooperators due to the treatment. dj(T )
may be different from zero either because the consumer assumes that other consumers have ex
ante strong asymmetric information on product characteristics and/or that the latter assume
that other consumers have (second order beliefs) in presence of a reciprocity argument.
The post-treatment cooperation condition therefore turns into
c <
1
n
b+ a+ rE(j + dj(T )) (A2” ’)
with the reciprocity argument raising even more than in (A2) the probability of shifting to the
cooperative strategy after the base label treatment (again under the necessary condition of the
existence of other-regarding preferences either under the form of the component A or of the same
reciprocity argument).
To conclude, the three versions of the model (base model, augmented with asymmetric infor-
mation on product characteristics, augmented with asymmetric information on product charac-
teristics and reciprocity effect) show that, for products for which the connection with health is
excluded, the base label treatment may have a positive and significant impact on the choice of
the cooperative strategy (that is, the choice of the responsible products advertised with the shelf
poster): i) only in presence of a nonzero other-regarding component combined with asymmetric
information on product characteristics ii) and/or a reciprocity argument with expectation that
the shelf poster will increase the number of cooperators. The simple presence of other-regarding
components without asymmetric information and/or reciprocity argument is not sufficient per se
to produce a significant post-treatment effect since, in that case, we are back to the base model
and nothing changes after the treatment on the area of the Prisoner’s dilemma and the inequality
ruling the cooperation condition. Note as well that the same theoretical framework may be used
to evaluate the effect of the label plus price increase treatment. In such case we must add to
the framework the impact of the change in the price difference between the conventional and the
responsible product taking into account the 5 or 10 percent increase of the latter. This effect
just raises (i.e., c) in the model thereby making more difficult the conditions for the responsible
choice.
Considering what developed above, the xjt vector of observed good characteristics when choosing
the responsible product in the Nevo specification under the base vote with the wallet model
(section 3.1) includes 1nb+ a− c that is, a quantity measuring the change in utility arising when
shifting from the conventional to the VV green product. This characteristics is unmodified by
the experiment. If, on the contrary, we are in the (second modified) asymmetric information
framework the base characteristics is (1/n)b+a[1− γσ2]− c before treatment and (1/n)b+a− c
19
after treatment with the treatment raising the utility of choosing the responsible product by aγσ2.
Under the (third modified) asymmetric information plus reciprocity version of the model the pre-
treatment characteristics is 1nb+ a[1− γσ2] + rE(j)− c, while the post-treatment characteristics
1
nb + a[1 − γσ2] + rE(j + dj(T )) − c. Hence the treatment raises the utility of choosing the
responsible product by aγσ2 + rE(dj(T )).
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